Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Session Types \[[@CR12], [@CR13], [@CR27]\] have emerged as a central formalism for the verification of concurrent and distributed programs. Session-types-based analysis ensures that a program correctly implements some predetermined *communication protocol*, stipulating the desired exchange of messages \[[@CR4], [@CR16]\]. The analysis is typically performed *statically*, via type checking, before the programs are deployed. However, full static analysis is not always possible (*e.g.,* when the source code of third-party programs and components is unavailable); in such cases, session types are checked at runtime via *monitors* \[[@CR6], [@CR10], [@CR17], [@CR19]\]. We view these approaches as two extremes on a continuum: our aim is to develop practical *hybrid* (static and dynamic) verification methodologies and tools for distributed programs in *open* settings. In particular, our aim is to verify distributed systems where: *(i)*we make no assumptions on how messages are delivered between components;*(ii)*the components available prior-deployment are checked statically; and*(iii)*the components that are unavailable for checking prior-deployment are verified at runtime, by deploying *autogenerated, type-checked monitors*.

To achieve this aim, we present a methodology with three key features, presented as contributions in this paper:

Open systems are prone to malicious attacks and data corruption. Thus, we describe protocols via *augmented session types* including *runtime data assertions* (reminiscent of interaction refinements \[[@CR18]\]), and synthesise *monitors* that automate such data checks. Unlike \[[@CR6], [@CR18]\], our monitors are independent, type-checked processes, that can be deployed over any network.We develop a tool that, given a session type *S*, can synthesise the Scala code of *(1)* a *type-checked monitor* that verifies at run-time whether an interaction abides by *S* (aim *(iii)*), and *(2)* the *signatures* usable to implement a process that interacts according to *S*, in a correct-by-construction manner (aim *(ii)*).Our monitor synthesis can *abstract over low-level communication protocols*, bridging across a variety of message transports (*e.g.,* TCP/IP, REST, *etc.*): this is key to facilitate the interaction with third-party (untyped) components in open systems (aim *(i)*); this is also unlike previous work on session monitoring (theoretical \[[@CR6]\] or practical \[[@CR19]\]) that focus on a specific technology and runtime system, or assume a centralised message routing medium.

Binary Sessions with Assertions {#Sec2}
===============================

A session type defines the intended behaviour of a participant that communicates with another over a *channel*. Our work is based on *session types with assertions*:

We assume a set of *base types* *B*, and introduce *payload identifiers V* (with their types) and *assertions* *A* (*i.e.*, predicates on payload values). *Branching* (or *external choice*) requires the participant to receive one message of the form $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Example 1 {#FPar1}
---------
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Design and Implementation {#Sec3}
=========================

We now give an overview (Sect. [3.2](#Sec5){ref-type="sec"}) and an example-driven tour (Sect. [3.3](#Sec6){ref-type="sec"}) of our methodology; but first, we summarise the toolkit underlying its implementation (Sect. [3.1](#Sec4){ref-type="sec"}).

Background: Session Programming with lchannels {#Sec4}
----------------------------------------------

lchannels \[[@CR21], [@CR24], [@CR25]\] is a library implementation of session types in the Scala programming language. Its API is inspired by the continuation-passing encoding of session types into the linear $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document}$-calculus \[[@CR9]\]. lchannels allows to implement a program that communicates according to a session type *S* by *(1)* translating *S* into a set of *Continuation-Passing Style Protocol classes* (CPSPc), capturing the order of send/receive operations in *S*; and *(2)* communicating via "one-shot" channel objects, having type Out\[A\] or In\[A\]---where A is a CPSP class. We show an example of CPSPc in Sect. [3.3](#Sec6){ref-type="sec"}. The main payoffs of lchannels are that *(1)* the CPSP classes restrict the usage the In\[A\]/Out\[A\] channel objects to receive/send messages according to *S*, letting the Scala compiler check *safety* (*i.e.,* only messages allowed by *S* are sent) and *exhaustiveness* (*i.e.,* all inputs allowed by *S* are handled); and *(2)* the library provides run-time linearity enforcement: *e.g.,* if a "one-shot" channel object is used twice to send messages, then the program is not advancing along *S*, hence lchannels discards the message and raises an error.
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Hybrid Verification via Static and Dynamic Checking {#Sec5}
---------------------------------------------------

We now illustrate how our methodology is implemented, as a tool \[[@CR7]\] targeting the Scala programming language. Consider the scenario on the right: a client C exchanges messages with a server Srv over a network. Srv implements the session type $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Our approach is outlined on the left. The accessible participant Srv is *statically* checked, and the behaviour of the inaccessible participant C is *dynamically* monitored at runtime. Given $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$S_{login}$$\end{document}$, the synthesiser Synth generates *(1)* the *Continuation-Passing-Style Protocol classes* (CPSPc) for representing $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$S_{login}$$\end{document}$ in Scala and lchannels (see Sect. [3.1](#Sec4){ref-type="sec"}), and *(2)* the source code of a runtime monitor (Mon), based on the CPSPc above. Below are the CPSPc generated from $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$S_{login}$$\end{document}$ by our synthesiser: notably, they can be used to write a type-checked version of Srv.
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The messages sent from Srv to C (and *vice versa*) must pass through the monitor Mon. As Srv and Mon use lchannels to interact, they are statically typed according to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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When the monitor is initialised, it invokes CM to set up the communication channel with client C, through a suitable message transport: *e.g.*, in the case of TCP/IP, CM creates a socket and initialises the I/O buffers. Each message sent from Srv to Mon via lchannels is analysed by Mon, and if it conforms to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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A Step-by-Step Example {#Sec6}
----------------------

To illustrate our approach and implementation, we now follow the message exchanges prescribed by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We begin with the login request sent from a client over TCP/IP. The client's message is initially handled by the connection manager CM, which provides a receive method like the one shown above: it is invoked by Mon to retrieve messages. When invoked, receive checks the socket input buffer inBuf: if a new supported message is found (line 3, where the message matches the regex loginR), the corresponding CPSP class is returned to the monitor; otherwise, the unaltered message is returned (line 4).
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On the left is the synthesised code for Mon that handles the beginning of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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On the left is the synthesised code of Mon that handles the server's response to the client. According to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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If the server sends Success, including the value $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Notably, unlike the synthesised code of receiveLogin (that handles the previous external choice), there is no catch-all case for unexpected messages from Srv. In fact, here we assume that Srv is written in Scala and lchannels, hence statically checked, and conforming to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$S_{login}$$\end{document}$; hence, it can only send one of the expected messages (as per Sect. [3.1](#Sec4){ref-type="sec"}). The monitor only checks the assertions on Srv's messages.

![](495615_1_En_13_Figj_HTML){#MO10}

Finally, we review the send method of CM: it translates messages from a CPSP class instance to the format accepted by the client's transport protocol. In this case, the format is a textual representation of the session type. The catch-all case (lines 4--5) is for debugging purposes.

Conclusion {#Sec7}
==========

We presented our preliminary work on the hybrid verification of open distributed systems, based on *session types with assertions* and *automatically syntehsised monitors*---with a supporting tool \[[@CR7]\] based on the Scala programming language.

**Future Work.** Our approach adheres to the *"fail-fast"* design methodology: if an assertion fails, the monitor logs the violation and halts. In the practice of distributed systems, "fail-fast" is advocated as an alternative to defensive programming \[[@CR8]\]; it is also in line with existing literature on runtime verification \[[@CR5]\]. Our further rationale for this design choice is that we intend to investigate *monitorability* properties of session types, along the lines of recent work \[[@CR1], [@CR2], [@CR11]\], and identify any limits, in terms of what can be verified at runtime. We plan to extend our approach to multiparty sessions \[[@CR14], [@CR15]\], in connection to existing work \[[@CR22], [@CR23]\] based on lchannels and Scribble \[[@CR26], [@CR28]\]. Finally, we plan to investigate how to handle assertion violations by adding *compensations* to our session types, formalising how the protocol should proceed whenever an assertion fails.

**Related Work.** The work in \[[@CR6]\] formalises a theory of monitored (multiparty) session types, based on a global, centralised router providing a *safe transport network* that dispatches messages between participant processes. The main commonality with our work is that session types are used to synthesise monitors. The main differences (besides our focus on a tool implementation) are that *(1)* we do not assume a centralised message routing system, and consider the network adversarial (as per contribution [F1](#Par8){ref-type=""}) and use monitors to also protect typed participants; *(2)* our monitors can enforce data constraints, through assertions; and *(3)* in our setting, if a participant sends an invalid message, the monitor will flag violations (and stop computation) whereas \[[@CR6]\] drops the invalid message, but will continue forwarding the rest, akin to runtime enforcement via suppressions \[[@CR3]\]. Our protocol assertions are reminiscent of *interaction refinements* in \[[@CR18]\], that are also statically generated (by an F\# type provider), and dynamically enforced when messages are sent/received. However, we enforce our assertions by synthesising well-typed monitoring processes that can be deployed over a network, whereas \[[@CR18]\] injects dynamic checks in the local executable of a process.

The research was partly supported by the EU H2020 RISE programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 778233.
